Marquette Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 4 June 1930

Article 7

Attorney and Client: Solicitation: Disbarment
Cosmas B. Young

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Cosmas B. Young, Attorney and Client: Solicitation: Disbarment, 14 Marq. L. Rev. 230 (1930).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol14/iss4/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

The majority opinion holds that the administrator may appeal as a
party aggrieved, within the intention of the statute, because he stands
"as the representative of persons who would be injuriously affected by
a determination of the County Court, if it were allowed to stand," and
cites as authority for such position the case of McKenney v. Minahan,
119 Wis. 651.
The Court disposes of the contention that the widow's appeal should
be dismissed because not perfected by stating that inasmuch as-such
appeal was taken in good faith, "it would be our duty under Section
274.32 to stay the proceedings and permit it to be perfected."
THOMAS W. HAYDEN

Attorney and Client: Solicitation: Disbarment.
State v. Rubin,

..

Wis., __., 229 N.W. 30, decided February 4,

1930, was an action begun September 8, 1928, by the state bar commissioners, pursuant to the provisions of Section 256.28, of the Statutes of 1927 to disbar from practice W. B. Rubin, a prominent Milwaukee lawyer. The Circuit Court of Milwaukee, presided over by
Judge Aarons, was making a thorough investigation of ambulance
chasing as practiced in Milwaukee. The attempted investigation of
Mr. Rubin was met by him with passive and then active resistance.
Disbarment was asked. This was refused, but he was fined $500.00,
plus fees of the clerk, for unprofessional conduct.
The power of the. Supreme Court to discipline a member of its bar
by suspending or cancelling his license to practice law, when necessary
to protect the courts and the public, was well established in State v.
Cannon, 196 Wis., 534. State v. Cannon, however, differed from the
case under discussion in that there solicitors worked directly out of
the office of the attorney and devoted their time entirely to ambulance
chasing. Cannon was investigated at the same time as was Rubin.
The charges against Mr. Rubin were:
1. That he solicited cases;
2. Statements made by him in a document filed with Judge Aarons;
3. His conduct in connection with the filing of the affidavit for an
adverse examination in an action for conspiracy to defame.
The proof shows that Mr. Rubin never authorized anyone to solicit
cases for him, and that he never paid any ambulance chaser for services rendered in securing cases which came to his office. Of 26,000
cases handled through Mr. Rubin's office, only 13 were found to have
been solicited. One of these cases solicited was of a former client,
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three of them he personally solicited, and in them circumstances were
such as would lead anyone to believe he was to be retained. Ten of
these cases were biought to him by known ambulance chasers, but in
these cases the chasers had made their bargains with the client and had
nothing to expect of Mr. Rubin. These facts, the court was satisfied,
and rightly so, did not establish the fact that Mr. Rubin was a man
unfit to practice before the bar of this state. The court declared it
unethical for a member of the bar to solicit business, but two minor
infractions over a period of years would not render the offender unfit.
It is organized solicitation, by men tempted in their commercial zeal to
stir up litigation and to attempt to create causes of action where none
exist, that the courts must guard against. Mr. Rubin has consistently
opposed ambulance chasing; in 1915 he presented a bill to the Wisconsin Legislature prohibiting it, and placed a resolution before the state
bar association to accomplish the same purpose. The referee in the
instant case found that Mr. Rubin had given "his services in many
cases as a matter of charity."
Chapter 457 of the laws of 1927 (256.29) declares it ground for
disbarment for an attorney to "stir up strife and litigation; or to hunt
up causes of action and inform thereof, in order to be employed to
bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those having claims for
personal injuries, etc., or to employ agents and runners." A contract
of employment made in violation of this section is void as to the attorney.1 This statute does not apply to the agents or runners themselves. They may do such-work and then hand it over to an attorney.
The second charge against Mr. Rubin was for statements made by
him in an affidavit filed with Judge Aarons. In the process of investigation, by Judge Aarons' court, proof was offered that tended -to
connect Mr. Rubin with organized solicitation of cases. Mr. Rubin
then began an action against the three members of the bar conducting
the investigation, alleging in an affidavit for an adverse examination
that these men had conspired to defame him. At this the court summoned Mr. Rubin to be sworn to disclose the facts that led him to
make these charges. He refused to do so and was found guilty of
contempt. The Supreme Court upheld the contempt in Rubin v. State,
194 Wis., 207, and it directed him to testify in order to purge himself. This recital of the facts demonstrates that the filing of this document cannot be made the basis of any proceeding to discipline Mr.
Rubin. He resisted the right of the court to require him to disclose
the information contained in this document until he was forced to do
'From an address by Judge Aarons made June 21, 1928, at Madison, Wisconsin, before the Wisconsin State Bar Association.
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so by the mandate of the court in order to purge himself of contempt
and to escape confinement in jail.
The only thing that reflects upon Mr. Rubin is that this statement
discloses that he had accepted information as sufficient basis for his
charge of conspiracy without making investigation to determine
whether the information upon which he relied and acted was in fact
true. But this is not ground for disbarment. If all lawyers were disbarred who have started actions relying upon information that was
subsequently found to be unreliable, the number of the members of the
bar would be greatly reduced.
The third charge is also founded upon the affidavit. It was very
lengthy, and, as Mr. Rubin admitted, carried much offensive matter
that should have been omitted. One of his motives in making it was
the hope of it being published. Mr. Rubin had the right of questioning
the jurisdiction (Rubin v. State, 194 Wis., 207). So he can't be censured for questioning the power of the court to proceed with the
investigation.
"The only question that is open is whether he is subject to censure
because of the means adopted by him to present that question. Had
he responded to the request that he appear at the investigation and
meet the proof offered that tended to show that he had been guilty
of unprofessional conduct, as he met and explained it upon this trial,instead of sending the curt response that those conducting the investigation could go to hell,-he would have played the part of a highminded member of .ourprofession." If he had remained passive, nothing would have come of it, but his aggressive opposition was considered as being unprofessional conduct. One may have the right to
question the power of a governmental agency, but he may not do so
by casting aside all orderly procedure and seek to control such agency
by interrupting its proceedings, discrediting it, and intimidating its
officers as did Mr. Rubin. The case upholds Mr. Rubin for his stand
but not for his conduct. Justice Crownhart in his dissenting opinion
in State v. Cannon, supra, said, "If attorneys may be subjected to such
inquisitions and ruthless charges in the future, we may expect a weak
and spineless bar-one that will be afraid to fight the battles of the
poor and humble as they ought to be founght to secure justice."
COSMAS B. YOUNG

Bills and Notes: Negotiability: Reference to Other Instrument.
"A mere reference in a note to another instrument or mere statement of the transaction out of which the note arose does not destroy
its negotiability; but if in a note there is a reference to another agree-

